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Panpsychism, the view that phenomenal consciousness is possessed 
by all fundamental physical entities, faces an important challenge in 
the form of the combination problem: how do experiences of 
microphysical entities combine or give rise to the experiences of 
macrophysical entities such as human beings? An especially 
troubling aspect of the combination problem is the subject-summing 
argument, according to which the combination of subjects is not 
possible. In response to this argument, Goff (2016) and Miller (2017) 
have proposed the phenomenal bonding relation, using which they 
seek to explain the composition of subjects. In this paper, I discuss 
the merits of the phenomenal bonding solution and argue that it fails 
to respond satisfactorily to the subject-summing argument. 
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is possessed by all fundamental physical entities, faces an important 
challenge in the form of the combination problem: how do experiences of 
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macrophysical entities such as human beings? (Chalmers 2016a) 1  An 
especially troubling aspect of the combination problem is the subject-
summing argument, according to which the combination of subjects is not 
possible. In response to this argument, Goff (2016) and Miller (2017) have 
proposed the phenomenal bonding relation, with which they seek to 
explain the composition of subjects. In this paper, I argue that the 
phenomenal bonding solution does not work. I begin by introducing the 
combination problem and the subject-summing argument in §1, followed 
by an evaluation of Goff’s proposal in §2. Goff, even while proposing his 
solution, admits that we do not have a positive conception of the 
phenomenal bonding relation; Miller, however, argues that we do have 
such a conception. In §3, I argue against Miller’s attempt at forming a 
positive conception. The upshot of this discussion is that a panpsychist’s 




1. The Combination Problem 
 
The combination problem facing panpsychism is the question of 
explaining how the experiences of macrophysical entities, such as human 
beings, emerge from the experiences of microphysical entities. The 
challenge in providing an acceptable answer to this question is that the 
combination of experiences seems unintelligible—experiences just do not 
seem to be the kind of things that can combine. The most famous 
articulation of the combination problem is by William James, who says, 
 
Take a hundred of them [feelings], shuffle them and pack them 
as close together as you can (whatever that may mean); still 
each remains the same feeling it always was, shut in its own 
skin, windowless, ignorant of what the other feelings are and 
mean. There would be a hundred-and-first feeling there, if, 
when a group or series of such feelings were set up, a 
consciousness belonging to the group as such should emerge. 
And this 101st feeling would be a totally new fact; the 100 
original feelings might, by a curious physical law, be a signal 
for its creation, when they came together; but they would have 
no substantial identity with it, nor it with them, and one could 
never deduce the one from the others, or (in any intelligible 
sense) say that they evolved it. (James 1890, 160, original 
emphasis) 
                                                 
1 Also see Seager (1995), Goff (2006, 2009), and Coleman (2012, 2014) for more on the 
combination problem. 
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Here, James argues that a combination of ‘feelings’ is unintelligible, for 
each feeling is ‘windowless’—the content of one feeling cannot seep into 
another, or be shared with another. Given this, if there were a 101st feeling 
emerging from a group of hundred feelings, such an emergence would be 
a ‘totally new fact’—a case of brute emergence. 
 
While James’ argument talks of ‘feelings’ or experiences, it is the 
subjective component of experiences that has emerged as the most 
significant challenge—how do microphysical entities qua subjects 
(hereafter, microsubjects) combine to form other subjects such as 
macrophysical entities qua subjects (hereafter, macrosubjects)? (Chalmers 
2016a) The combination of subjects, as Coleman (2012) notes, seems 
unintelligible and thus impossible, due to certain intuitions about the nature 
of subjects.2 First, subjects seem to be ontological unities, or entities that, 
in the words of Galen Strawson (2009), are “fundamentally unified, utterly 
indivisible as the particular concrete phenomenon it is, simply in being, 
indeed, a total experiential field” (377-78). Such a unified subject 
experiencing a complex experience cannot be broken down into and 
understood in terms of multiple subjects, each experiencing one aspect or 
‘part’ of the complex experience. In other words, a subject understood as 
an ontological unity cannot be broken down into ‘parts’. 3  How can a 
macrosubject, then, be composed of microsubjects? 
Closely related to the unity of a subject is its privacy 4 —a subject’s 
experience is private to that subject, and it seems unintelligible how 
another subject could access the same token experiential content as the first 
subject. One could, perhaps, imagine a situation where two subjects 
experience identical experiential content. For example, consider a future 
where we have developed advanced scientific equipment that allows us to 
invoke specific experiences in a subject. Using this equipment, a scientist 
can bring about identical experience as of eating an apple in two friends. 
Such a situation would be a case where there are two tokens of the same 
experiential content (the experience as of eating an apple), each 
experienced by a distinct subject, and not a case where two distinct subjects 
                                                 
2 Coleman (2012) himself does not use the terms that I use here—ontological unity and 
privacy—but makes the same point. For example, he is alluding to both unity and privacy 
when he says, “…our notion of a subject, is precisely the notion of a discrete, essentially 
inviolable sphere of conscious-experiential goings-on. My mind is separate from your 
mind, is separate from her mind, and so on. None of us has, nor can have, access to the 
consciousness of another, to what it is like for them” (Coleman 2012, 145, emphasis in 
original).  
3 See Barnett (2008) for more on the intuition that subjects are mereological simples i.e. 
without proper parts.  
4 The term privacy is borrowed from Roelofs (2019).  
EuJAP | Vol. 17 | No. 1 | 2021                     Discussion 1  
 8 
experience the same token experiential content. This is what is meant by 
the privacy of subjects—two subjects cannot experience the same token 
experiential content. If the experiential content of one subject cannot be 
experienced by another, how can the experiential content of microsubjects 
constitute the experience of a macrosubject? Thus, we see that the 
ontological unity and privacy of subjects seem to render the combination 
of subjects impossible. 
 
This problem facing panpsychism has come to be known as the no-
summing-of-subjects argument (Goff 2016) or simply the subject-summing 
argument (Chalmers 2016a). Goff articulates the argument as follows: 
 
1. Conceptual Isolation of Subjects—For any group of subjects, 
instantiating certain conscious states, it is conceivable that just 
those subjects with those conscious states exist in the absence of 
any further subject. 
2. Transparency Conceivability Principle—For any proposition P, if 
(A) P involves only quantifiers, connectives, and predicates 
expressing transparent concepts, and (B) P is conceivably true 
upon ideal reflection, then P is meta-physically possibly true. 
3. Phenomenal transparency—Phenomenal concepts are transparent.  
4. Metaphysical Isolation of Subjects—For any group of subjects, 
instantiating certain conscious states, it is possible that just those 
subjects with those states exist in the absence of any further subject 
(from 1, 2, and 3). 
5. For any group of subjects, those subjects with those conscious 
states cannot account for the existence of a further subject (from 
4).  
6. Therefore, panpsychism is false (from 5) (Goff 2016, 291-92) 
 
Premise 1 states that one can conceive of n subjects and their experiences 
without the existence of a further, n+1th subject. This, as noted above, is 
underpinned by the intuition that subjects are ontological unities. Premise 
2 states that if any proposition that involves transparent concepts is 
conceivably true, it is also possibly true. Further, our concepts of 
experiential phenomena, including of subjects are transparent concepts, 
according to premise 3. Thus, from 1, 2 and 3, it follows that it is possible 
that n subjects exist without the sum of these n subjects—a further, n+1th 
subject—existing. If this were the case, it follows that panpsychism is 
false, for the existence of microsubjects cannot explain the emergence of 
macrosubjects (such as human subjects), leading to an explanatory gap. 
Faced with this explanatory gap, panpsychism loses its attraction as an 
alternative to physicalism and dualism. 
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A panpsychist could argue that the relation between microsubjects and 
macrosubjects is not one of composition but something else, such as 
ontological emergence. Chalmers (2016b) refers to panpsychist positions 
that propose that macroexperiences are composed of microexperiences as 
constitutive panpsychism, and those that do not as non-constitutive 
panpsychism. For the purpose of this paper, I ignore non-constitutive 
views, and deal only with the combination problem facing constitutive 
versions. I hence reserve the term ‘panpsychism’ for its constitutive 
version, unless otherwise specified. 
 
 
2. The Phenomenal Bonding Response 
 
In response to the subject-summing argument, Goff (2016) proposes the 
phenomenal bonding relation. He concedes that the mere existence of n 
subjects and their experiential content in themselves does not necessitate 
the presence of an n+1th subject. However, Goff argues that it is possible 
for the n subjects to enter into a relation—“be involved in some state of 
affairs” (Goff 2016, 292)—which necessitates the existence of a composite 
macrosubject. He calls this relation the phenomenal bonding (PB) relation. 
A collection of bricks in themselves do not compose a wall but do so only 
when they are related in a particular manner—spatially arranged in certain 
ways. Goff argues that similarly, a collection of subjects in themselves do 
not compose a further subject, but do so only when they are related by the 
PB relation. If we were to accept the phenomenal bonding relation, a 
panpsychist can respond to the subject-summing argument by arguing that 
premise 4 does not lead us to conclusions 5 and 6, for subjects which share 
the phenomenal bonding relation can account for a further subject of 
experience.   
 
Goff himself admits that we have no positive conception of the PB relation. 
However, he contends that it is understandable why we have no conception 
of a relation between subjects, for we have neither perceptual nor 
introspective access to subjects barring our own. Despite having no 
positive conception of the PB relation, Goff thinks that there is no reason 
to deny that such a relation between subjects is possible; just as 
panpsychists have to identify some phenomenal property with the physical 
property ‘charge’ in a brute manner, the PB relation too will have to be 
identified with some physical relation (Goff 2016). 
 
It is here that Goff’s proposal faces a problem. The thrust of the subject 
summing argument is not that the subject-combination relation cannot be 
identified with some physical relation in a brute manner—we could, if we 
had good reasons to believe that subject combination is possible. Rather, 
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as Coleman (2012) notes, it is that the notion of a composite subject itself 
seems incoherent, and thus impossible, on account of the ontological unity 
and privacy of subjects.5,6 Given this, the subject summing argument ought 
to be understood as the problem of the unintelligibility, incoherence and 
thus, impossibility of relations such as the PB relation. By simply defining 
and stipulating the PB relation in terms of the role we want it to play, 
without either an argument for how subject combination is possible in the 
first place or a positive conception of the relation, Goff is assuming what 
ought to be argued for, and thus begging the question.  
 
One can adopt such a method of defining relations in a brute manner to 
defend almost any unintelligible relation. For example, consider the 
example of ‘volume’ in Euclidean space. When there are two perfect cubes 
of 1-unit volume each conjoined together at one of their surfaces with no 
overlap of volume, the total volume of the newly formed cuboid would be 
2 units. If one were to follow Goff’s method, one can simply define a new 
relation called ‘volume-contraction’ such that when the two cubes are 
conjoined, the total volume would not be 2 units, but only 1.5 units. 
Further, it could be argued that while such a relation is unintelligible to us, 
this is so only because volume contraction is a brute fact about the world.  
One can immediately see that positing such a volume-contraction relation 
is wrong. Without a further positive characterisation of the volume-
contraction relation, it is unintelligible to us how the total volume of two 
cubes with conjoined surface can be 1.5 units instead of 2 units. By 
proposing the volume-contraction relation as a brute posit, we would be 
assuming what ought to be explained (that such volume contraction is 
possible). Similarly, by simply defining the phenomenal bonding relation 
such that it fulfils the role of subject composition, Goff is assuming what 
ought to be explained in the first place.   
 
 
3. Positive Conception of Phenomenal Bonding 
 
Proponents of the PB relation can avoid begging the question if they are 
able to provide a positive conception of the relation. This is what Miller 
                                                 
5 This distinction between two versions of the subject combination problem is made more 
clearly by Shani and Williams (2021). In the first version, similar to Goff’s (2016) 
articulation, it is argued that no arrangement of subjects necessitates a composite subject, 
and hence, subject composition is impossible. According to the second, similar to 
Coleman’s (2012) articulation, it is argued that the notion of a composite subject itself is 
unintelligible and incoherent, and hence, subject composition is impossible. Shani and 
Williams argue that the second is the stronger and more difficult challenge facing 
panpsychists.  
6 I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for pressing this point. 
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(2017) attempts. He identifies three conditions a relation ought to fulfil to 
qualify as the phenomenal bonding relation:  
 
 It must be a phenomenal relation i.e., there should be a what-it-is-
like feel associated with it. 
 Its relata should be subjects qua subjects. 
 It must necessitate further subjects distinct from the subjects it 
holds between (Miller 2017). 
 
Miller further identifies co-consciousness as the relation that fulfils these 
conditions and fits the role required of the PB relation. By co-
consciousness, Miller refers to the “the relation in virtue of which 
conscious experiences have a conjoint phenomenology or a conjoint what-
it-is-like-ness” (Miller 2017, 548). For example, when one looks at a bird 
while listening to it chirp, the auditory quality of the bird’s chirp and the 
visual quality of its appearance are experienced together as a unified 
experience. The relation that unifies these two qualities to produce the 
conjoint phenomenology of our experience is what Miller refers to as co-
consciousness. 
 
Miller contends that the co-consciousness relation is known to us through 
our own experiences, for it feels some way for us to experience the 
qualities in a unified manner. That is, there is a phenomenal quality 
associated with the co-consciousness relation. It thus fulfils the first 
condition to fit the role of the PB relation. The second condition facing co-
consciousness is that it ought to hold between subjects qua subjects. In the 
example given earlier, the co-consciousness relation holds between two 
qualities that are experienced by the same subject. Can we conceive of a 
similar co-consciousness relation that holds between two subjects instead 
of qualities? While Goff argued that we cannot conceive of any relations 
between subjects qua subjects because we have epistemic access through 
introspection only to one subject—our own—Miller contends that this 
limitation can be overcome. He proposes that one could form a positive 
conception of inter-subject co-consciousness through analogical 
extension.  
 
Analogical extension, according to Miller, is a method of concept 
formation wherein we start with a case where we have a clear conception 
(hereafter, the prototype scenario), and use this conception to form a 
concept in another scenario that is not wholly similar to the first (hereafter, 
the target scenario). Some examples of analogical extension he gives are: 
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 We form a concept of the molecule as a physical object using 
visual representations of macrophysical entities that we have, 
though we do not have visual representations of molecules. 
 We form a concept of the relation ‘earlier than’ as it applies to 
vast tracts of time (e.g., on cosmic scale) though we only 
experience events across much smaller periods (like a few second, 
days, months etc.).  
 We form a concept of similarity of phenomenal states across 
subjects, though we only experience our own phenomenal states 
and conceive of them as being similar to each other. 
  
In all these examples, we use the concept from a known scenario to form a 
concept in a different scenario. Miller contends that we can use this method 
to form a positive conception of the inter-subject co-consciousness relation 
based on our concept of intra-subject co-consciousness.  
 
However, this approach does not work for the following reasons. First, 
consider the examples cited by Miller. It is important to note that in each 
of these examples, the relata in the prototype and target scenarios are of 
the same type. In the case of the ‘earlier than’ relation, the relata are events-
in-time in both scenarios. In the case of phenomenal similarity, the relata 
are qualities-experienced-by-a-subject. In the case of molecules as 
physical objects, the relata are objects-in-space in both scenarios. In 
contrast to these three examples, in the case of co-consciousness, the relata 
in the prototype and target scenarios are not of the same type. The relata of 
the intra-subject co-consciousness relation—the prototype—are qualities 
experienced by a subject. On the other hand, in the case of the inter-subject 
co-consciousness relation—the target—the relata are subjects qua subjects 
and not qualities experienced by a subject (same or different subjects). This 
is as per Miller’s own criteria that any relation has to meet to qualify as the 
phenomenal bonding relation (the second criterion listed above). Thus, 
unlike the examples used by Miller to outline analogical extension, the type 
of relata in the prototype and target scenarios are different in the case of 
the co-consciousness relation. For this reason, analogical extension cannot 
help us form a positive conception of co-consciousness between subjects 
qua subjects.  
 
Even if we were to ignore this drawback, there is another problem in using 
analogical extension to form a positive conception of inter-subject co-
consciousness. It seems that if one were allowed to use analogical 
extension to form a conception of inter-subject co-consciousness, one 
could use analogical extension to form positive conceptions of relations 
which we know are definitely not acceptable. Consider the example from 
earlier, of volume contraction of two cubes in Euclidean three-dimensional 
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space, occupying 1-unit volume each, conjoined together with one 
overlapping surface and no overlapping portion of volume. Everyone 
would accept that such a volume-contraction relation is inconceivable. 
However, it seems that one can use analogical extension (of the sort 
required for inter-subject co-consciousness) to form a positive conception 
of the volume-contraction relation too. One could argue thus:  
 
Start with the following prototype scenario: volume 
contraction relation in cases where two cubes, each 
individually occupying 1-unit volume, overlap not just along a 
surface but in part of their volumes as well. In this case, the 
volume contraction relation—the relation between the cubes on 
account of which the total volume occupied by them together 
is less than 2 units—is intelligible and we have a positive 
conception of such a relation. Now, we can use the positive 
conception of volume contraction in volume-overlapping cases 
as the prototype scenario and form a positive conception of 
volume contraction in the scenario where there is overlap only 
along a surface (and no overlap of volume). 
 
Would such a proposal be acceptable? Can we claim to have a positive 
conception of the volume-contraction relation based on this argument? 
Clearly, we cannot. The lesson here is that analogical extension works only 
in some cases. How do we know that co-consciousness relation is not like 
volume-contraction (where analogical extension does not work) but like 
phenomenal similarity (where analogical extension does work)? In the 
cases of inter-subject co-consciousness and volume-contraction, it is not 
just that we do not have a positive conception of these relations, but that 
we also have a priori reasons to believe that the relation in question leads 
to contradictions. For example, given our conception of Euclidean space, 
cubes and volumes, it is a priori true that the volume of non-overlapping 
cubes conjoined along a surface is just the sum of the volumes of the two 
cubes. Positing volume contraction without changing any of our initial 
conceptions (of what Euclidean space, cubes or volumes are) leads to a 
contradiction. Similarly, given ontological unity and privacy of subjects, 
positing co-consciousness relation between two subjects leads to 
contradictions—if inter-subject co-consciousness and composite subjects 
were possible, privacy and ontological unity of subjects would be false. In 
contrast, we have no a priori reason to believe that phenomenal similarity 
between qualities experienced by different subjects leads to any 
contradiction. Hence, we can use analogical extension to form a positive 
conception of this relation based on phenomenal similarity between 
qualities experienced by the same subject. Similarly, we have no a priori 
reason to believe that the ‘earlier than’ relation, when applied to vast tracts 
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of time, leads to contradictions. Hence, we can use analogical extension to 
form a positive conception of this relation based on the known prototype. 
 
To summarise, Miller’s proposal to form a positive conception of the inter-
subject co-consciousness relation through analogical extension does not 
work for two reasons. First, co-consciousness as known to us is a relation 
that holds between qualities and not between subjects qua subjects. On the 
other hand, the relation we want to form a positive conception of (inter-
subject co-consciousness) is required to hold between subjects qua 
subjects. Second, the kind of analogical extension that is required from a 
positive conception of inter-subject co-consciousness can be used to form 
a positive conception of relations that we know are definitely not possible 
(such as the volume-contraction relation). This serves as a reductio ad 
absurdum against Miller’s argument.  
 
Miller’s proposal is now in the same boat as Goff’s—both fail to provide 
a positive conception of the phenomenal bonding relation. Without a 
positive conception, the phenomenal bonding solution simply assumes that 
composite subjects are possible, while the possibility of composite subjects 





The phenomenal bonding solution to the combination problem does not 
work, for we have no positive conception of such a relation, while we have 
good reasons to believe that such a relation is not possible. Goff’s argument 
for the phenomenal bonding relation in the absence of a positive 
conception is not acceptable; neither is Miller’s attempt at motivating a 
positive conception of the relation. In the absence of such a conception, 
proponents of this approach are guilty of begging the question against the 
subject-summing argument.  
 
Where does this leave panpsychism? While it is only one approach to 
constitutive panpsychism that has been refuted here, it is likely that the 
challenge posed here would equally apply to any solution that seeks to 
explain combination of subjects—in the absence of a positive conception 
of the subject-composition relation, the solution would be guilty of 
assuming what ought to be argued for. Thus, in response to the 
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